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Lefebvre: Actual Damages: A No-Win Proposition for the Antitrust Plaintiff

CASE COMMENTS
ACTUAL DAMAGES: A NO-WIN PROPOSITION
FOR THE ANTITRUST PLAINTIFFt "

J. Truett Payne Co. v. ChryslerMotors Corp., 101 S.Ct. 1923 (1981)
2
1
Petitioner, owner of a Chrysler dealership, brought suit in federal court
3
alleging that Chrysler's discriminatory use of sales incentive quotas violated
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.4 Petitioner also sought treble damages
under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 5 Following a jury verdict for petitioner, the
7
trial court awarded treble damages.8 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
petitioner had failed to prove actual injury as required by section 4 of the
Clayton Act. 8 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the ap-

*Editor's Note: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the Summer 1981 Quarter.
1. 101 S. Ct. 1923 (1981). Petitioner owned a Chrysler-Plymouth dealership in Birmingham, Alabama, and had been in business since about 1944. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3.
2. After the petitioner went out of business, Chrysler Credit Corporation filed suit against
the petitioner seeking recovery of unpaid loans. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne
Co., 607 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated sub noa. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., I01 S. Ct. 1923 (1981). The petitioner responded by filing this suit against
Chrysler Corporation in the United States District Court of the Northern District of Alabama,
Southern Division. Id. The district judge reversed the Chrysler Credit issue from the Chrysler
Motors issue. Id. at 1135.
3. During the time period involved, from December, 1970 to May, 1974, Chrysler maintained a variety of sales incentive programs. Of the 16 rebate and incentive programs offered
during this time, only 13 were involved in this suit. The 13 programs were of two basic types
and lasted several months. The first type paid a bonus for every retail sale in excess of a
preset number. The second type set a quota of cars to be purchased from Chrysler and offered
a bonus on the cars purchased in excess of that quota. The quotas were computed by Chrysler
and varied from dealer-to-dealer. The computations were made according to a uniform
formula and used such factors as the dealer's market potential and prior sales.
The petitioner competed with three other Chrysler dealers in the relevant market area.
These dealers were Roebuck Chrysler-Plymouth, Central Motors, and Bessemer ChryslerPlymouth (sometimes called Hall Motor Company). These dealers were all located in different
portions of the Birmingham-Jefferson County area. The petitioner alleged that Chrysler set
its competitor's quotas lower than petitioner's. In order to meet its quotas and qualify for a
rebate, the petitioner had to sell more cars at retail or purchase more cars at wholesale than
did the other dealers. Since it was unable to meet these higher quotas, the petitioner did not
receive a rebate, and thus paid more per unit than its competitors, who were able to meet
their lower objectives and thereby qualify for a rebate. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3-7.
4. Antidiscrimination in Price (Robinson-Patman) Act §2(a), 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (1976)
(amending Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, §2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)).
5. Clayton Antitrust Act §4, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976).
6. 101 S. Ct. at 1926. The jury awarded petitioner $111,247.48. Id. The trial court trebled
this and added attorney's fees resulting in a judgment of $373,742.44 against Chrysler Motors
Corporation. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2.
7. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated
sub nom. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 101 S. Ct. 1923 (1981).
8. Section 4 of the Clayton Act reads in pertinent part: "[a]ny person who shall be in-
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peal court's judgment, remanded the case for further proceedings and HELD
that proving a violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, without
more, does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a damage award.9
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits discriminatory pricing
practices that could have a detrimental effect on competition. 10 To prove a
violation of section 2(a), one need only show that the pricing practice complained of is potentially destructive of competition.- Section 4 of the Clayton
Act is a remedial statute offering treble damages to persons injured by actions
violative of the antitrust laws.12 Congress passed this provision to promote
private policing of the antitrust laws.' 8
The Supreme Court has virtually ignored the interaction of these two provisions. 14 Section 2(a) has been construed by itself and applied solely in actions
in which injunctions and cease and desist orders have been sought. 5 Because
the Court has granted only injunctive relief, lower courts have had to decide,
without direction, whether damages could be awarded for Robinson-Patman
violations.16 To obtain damages, plaintiffs must prove an antitrust violation
occurred and that this breach caused them some injury.17 In Robinson-Patman
section 2(a) cases where damages were sought, the issue was whether proof of
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefore in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976).
9. 101 S. Ct. at 1930.
10. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act reads in pertinent part: "Ei]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly
or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are
in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the
United States ... and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... " 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (1976).
11. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948) ("the statute does require the
Commission to find that injury has actually resulted'); Corn Prod. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726,
742 (1945) (the statute does not "require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed
competition").
12. See note 8 supra. The instant Court states, "[s]ection 4 of the Clayton Act is essentially a remedial statute." 101 S. Ct. at 1927.
13. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947) ("Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforcement"). Accord, Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 386 (1958) (Douglas, J., Warren, CJ., Black, J., & Brennan, J.
dissenting).
14. The Court did not prohibit Robinson-Patman Act suits where the remedy prayed for
was damages; rather, the Court had never addressed the interrelationship of the two acts.
15. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (action for injunction prohibiting quantity discounts); Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) (action for injunction prohibiting basing point system).
16. See generally Weinburg, Recent Trends in Antitrust Civil Action Damage Determinations,1976 DuKE L.J. 485 (1976).
17. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969).
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the statutory violation was sufficient to infer the plaintiff was injured. Some
courts ruled injury could be so inferred;' 8 others held such injury must be
proven with specificity. 19
The Eighth Circuit adopted a leading interpretation of section 2 damage
recovery in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co. 2 0 In Elizabeth Arden,
a retail distributor brought a damage suit under sections 2(d) and (e) alleging
Elizabeth Arden had established a discriminatory compensation arrangement
for its product distribution.21 The court found a section 2(d) violation and
measured the damages as the difference between the amount received by the
22
favored store and that received by the plaintiff. In justifying this recovery,
the court reasoned that the Robinson-Patman Act requires all customers to be
treated equally.22 By awarding the amount of the discrimination as damages,
the court sought to equalize the amounts received by the favored and disfavored customers. 24 Later courts characterized the Elizabeth Arden rationale
as the automatic damages theory.2 5 According to this rationale, the appropriate
measure of damages in Robinson-Patman cases was the amount of the price
discrimination; no evidence of more specific injury was required. 26 Despite this
18. See, e.g., Grace v. E.J. Kogin Co., 588 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976); Fowler Mfg. Co. v.
Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970); Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
19. The landmark case in this area is Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). Accord, Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980); Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1961).
20. 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). This was the second case in
which a plaintiff received damages under the Robinson-Patman Act. The first was Ky.-Tenn.
Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. (unreported W.D. Ky. 1941), aJ'd sub nor. Fitch
v. Ky.-Tenn. Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
21. 150 F.2d at 990. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation entered into an agreement with
Gus Blass Company, a department store, for Gus Blass to carry the Elizabeth Arden product
line. Gus Blass designated one of its cosmetic clerks the Elizabeth Arden "demonstrator," and
Elizabeth Arden agreed to pay Gus Blass $10 a week toward this clerk's salary. Elizabeth
Arden, however, had an agreement with one of Blass' competitors to reimburse the store $20
a week for the salary of that store's "demonstrator." Id. at 989-90.
22. Id. at 990, 995-96.
23. Id. at 996.
24. Id. "To relieve the seller of the obligation to equalize such a discrimination through
readily determinable general damages, where no special damages exist or are claimed, would
be to weaken the effectiveness of the statute in compelling obedience to its commands." Id.
The court seemed to be intent on fashioning a remedy which would approximate the result
sought by the Act.
25. 101 S. Ct. at 1927 n.2. Given the nature of the "automatic damages" theory it might
be more accurate to characterize it as "minimum damages." It operates once the plaintiff has
proven that the defendant violated section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act through discriminatory practices. The theory incorporates two concepts. First, once the violation has been proven,
the jury is permitted to infer that the defendant's violation of the Robinson-Patman Act injured the plaintiff. No further proof of actual injury need be presented in order to allow
the jury to make the inference. Second, once causation has been inferred, damages are assessed in the amount of the illegal pricing differential. This does not mean that the jury cannot find additional incidental damages; rather, once the jury has made the appropriate inference, the amount of the price discrimination becomes the minimal figure of the plaintiff's
injury. See generally Weinberg, supra note 16.
26. Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1969).
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broad interpretation, the Elizabeth Arden decision was technically limited to
2
damage awards for section 2(d) violations. 7
The Supreme Court subsequently authorized recovery of damages for all
Robinson-Patman Act violations in Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co. 2 8 In
Bruce's Juices, the American Can Co. sued seeking to foreclose on promissory
notes executed by Bruce's Juices to secure the purchase of cans.2 Bruce's Juices
responded by counterarguing the notes were void for want of consideration and
illegalityo because it had been discriminately charged more for the cans than
other purchasers. 31 The Supreme Court found the notes valid, maintaining that
if Congress had intended to provide contract invalidation as a RobinsonPatman Act remedy, it would have done so explicitly.32 The Court, nevertheless, stated that if Bruce's Juices could prove the price discrimination- a in a
separate damage suit,34 it would be entitled to recover three times the amount
of discrimination,
The Supreme Court's statement in Bruce's Juices seemingly approved the
automatic damages rationale utilized in Elizabeth Arden.36 Many courts
27. Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act are aimed at preventing the discriminatory granting of promotional allowances and services. 15 U.S.C. §l5(d)-(e) (1976). For
a discussion of the purposes of sections 2(d) and 2(e), see E.

KMTNER,

A

ROBINSON-PATMAN

P umER 227-50 (1970).
28. 320 U.S. 743 (1947). For a brief discussion of Bruce's Juices, see Note, Enforceability
of ContractsWhich Violate the Robinson-PatmanAct, 55 YALE L.J. 820 (1946).
29. Bruce's Juices was a canner that purchased most of its cans from American. Over time,
a debt grew which was secured by promissory notes. On several occasions, the notes were renewed after being reduced by the amount Bruce's had paid. When Bruce's Juices eventually
defaulted, the promissory notes totalled approximately $114,000. 30 U.S. at 744.
American Can Co. brought suit in Florida circuit court. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment for plaintiff and Bruce's Juices appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 745.
30. Id. at 744.
31. Id. at 744-45.
32. Id. at 750-52.
33. The Court declined to say whether American Can had violated the Robinson-Patman
Act. Id. at 747. The difficulty the Court saw in Bruce's Juices was that the promissory notes
did not relate to specific transactions, but represented a running total of the debt owed American. Thus, part of the total amount owed could have represented non-discriminatory transactions. Id. at 746-48.
34. At the time the Court wrote its opinion, Bruce's Juices was involved in a treble
damage suit against American Can Company. Id. at 752. See American Can Co. v. Bruce's
Juices, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds & rehearingdenied, 190 F.2d 73
(5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
35. The Court further stated, "no reason suggests itself why Congress should have intended a remedy by which the victim of discrimination could recover by defense only onethird of what he could recover, on the same proof, by offense." 330 U.S. at 757. The Court
distinguished between the offensive and defensive use of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. Using
discrimination as the basis for a damage suit, the plaintiff would be entitled to three times
the price discrimination. The Court saw this as a much more effective means of furthering
the goals of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id.
36. The Supreme Court did not explicitly mention Elizabeth Arden in its Bruce's Juices
opinion. Both cases, however, contain language approving the amount of the price discrimination as the measure of damages. Compare note 24 supra with 330 U.S. at 757.
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specifically cited Bruce's Juices in awarding Robinson-Patman Act damages.'7
Other courts, however, freely rejected the Elizabeth Arden measure of damages
and dismissed the statements in Bruce's Juices as dicta. 3s The latter decisions
tended to focus on the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, observing that the original Senate version of the Act 39 contained a provision making
the amount of the price disa-imination the correct measure of damages. 4 0 This
provision was deleted in conference, 41 however, and circuits that rejected automatic damages construed this deletion as a congressional policy decision against
the automatic damages concept. 42
Judge Learned Hand supported this view in Enterprise Industries, Inc. v.
Texas Co.43 He declared that the amount of the price discrimination was not
44
necessarily the proper measure of damages for a Robinson-Patman violation.
The Enterprise decision involved Texaco's sale of gasoline 45 at reduced prices
to retail filling stations involved in a gas war.46 The plaintiff filling station, 47
which was not in the immediate vicinity of the gas war, alleged that Texaco
charged it more than the other nearby stations thereby injuring its ability to
compete.4 8 The Second Circuit refused to treat the Bruce's Juices language as
37. See Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1012 (1970).
38. See Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
965 (1957).
39. For a brief description of the legislative history of the Robinson Bill and the Patman
Bill (the House version of the bill), see H. SHNIDERMAN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN PERSPECTIVE,
3-5 (1977); E. KINTNER, supra note 27.
40. The Robinson and Patman bills were identical when introduced. Their provision on
damages read: "[fqor purposes of suit under section 4 of this Act, the measure of damages
from any violation of this section shall, in the absence of proof of greater damage, be presumed to be the unit amount of the prohibited discrimination, payment, or grant concerned,
multiplied by - (1) the volume of business involved in such violation in case the plaintiff
shall be in competition with the grantor therein in the distribution of the products or commodities concerned, and (2) the volume of plaintiff's business in the respective products and
commodities, and for the period of time concerned in such violation, in case the plaintiff shall
be in competition with the grantee therein .
H.R. 8442 & S. 3154, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935).
41. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
42. The refusal to judicially legislate or to interpret legislation contrary to Congress'
perceived intent is a judicially recognized restraint on the courts. See Great AtI. & Pac. Tea,
Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-201
(1974).
43. 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
44. Id. at 459.
45. Texaco sold to 10 Texaco filling stations in the Hartford, Connecticut area. These 10
were the plaintiff and nine of its competitors. Id. at 457-58.
46. Between November 1950 and February 1952 there were two such gas wars in the
Hartford area. The first lasted from November 1950 until July 1951, and the second from
November 1951 until February 1952. During each gas war, Texaco reduced its selling price to
the stations in the immediate vicinity of the gas war to allow them to maintain a net profit
margin of two cents per gallon sold. Id. at 458.
47. The plaintiff owned and operated a filling station in Wethersfield, Connecticut, a
short distance south of Hartford on the main highway between Boston and New York. Id.
58. Enterprise was not in the vicinity of the gas wars, and thus did not qualify for the
price allowance given to the Texaco stations involved in the price war. Enterprise, however,
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dispositive, stating that the amount of the price discrimination in that case
might have properly reflected the actual injury suffered. 49 Judge Hand reasoned
that actual injury was not a necessary consequence of price discrimination"
and that overcharge and discrimination were separate concepts that should not
be confused.51 While proof of discriminatory pricing potentially injurious to
competition was sufficient to prove a Robinson-Patman violation, a showing of
actual injury was required in order to recover damages under it.s2 The disfavored party in Enterprise consequently had to show lost sales, lower return
per sale or otherwise actual, quantifiable injury to recover damages under the
Robinson-Patman Act.L83
Although the Elizabeth Arden rationale functioned as an incentive to antitrust litigation,5 4 the Enterprise actual injury rule frustrated private enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act.55 The difficulty and complexity of proving
damages under the Enterprise rule acted as a disincentive to such suits5 s As a
result, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Enterpriserule in Fowler Manufacturing
alleged that although the higher price it paid did not harm its ability to compete with other
brands in the immediate vicinity, the higher price did affect its ability to compete with its
Texaco competitors for local commuting motorists. Id.
49. Id. at 459. Judge Hand reasoned that the language "was only an answer to the
buyer's argument that, unless he was allowed to disaffirm the sale, he would be without any
other relief. In that case the addition of 5% to the cost to the plaintiff of its cans ... might
well not have been passed on to the consumer and have been absorbed by the canners, who
sold fruit juices in cans. If that were true, the amount of the discrimination might well be a
proper measure of the buyer's damages." Id. It is interesting to note that Judge Hand believed the seller's liability was at least partially dependent upon the buyer's passing on the
increased cost or absorbing it. This "pass-on" defense was invalidated by the United States
Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 892 U.S. 481 (1968).
50. Judge Hand found Justice Cardozo's discussion of antitrust damages in Interstate
Commerce Comm'n. v. United States, 289 U.S. 885, 890-91 (1938), to be relevant. 240 F.2d at
459-60. Cardozo had stated that a buyer would be hurt if the favored purchasers or shippers
diverted business away from the disfavored party, or if the disfavored party was forced to
reduce his price in order to compete. 289 U.S. at 890-91. However, none of these injuries was
a necessary consequence of discrimination. Id.
51. 240 F.2d at 460.
52. Id. at 458-59.
53. Id. at 459.
54. See note 24 supra.
55. Commentators have argued that to the extent the plaintiff is forced to search for
evidence difficult or impossible to find rather than relying on readily available evidence of
the price discrimination, the effectiveness of the Robinson-Patman Act is weakened. See
Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience, 80
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 181,215-16 (1951).
56. One commentator stated, "[many] cases that have been started have ended in defeat,
with a plaintiff who has successfully established 'the defendant's violation of the Act going
away empty-handed. Although a number of reasons might be assigned, the real culprit seems
to be in the inability to prove damages to the satisfaction of the judiciary." Barber, supra
note 55, at 210.
The burden of proving the amount of damages and causation with great specificity may
result in even fewer plaintiffs receiving monetary awards for the defendant's violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act. See Barber, supra note 55, at 218. Contra, Rez, Causation and Automatic Damages in Secondary-Line Injury Cases Under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act: Is Fowler v. Gorlick Dead?,55 NoTr DAME LAW. 660 (1980).
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Co. v. Gorlick.57 Building upon the groundwork laid by Elizabeth Arden and
Bruce's Juices, the Fowler court held the Robinson-Patman Act allowed the act
of price discrimination itself to be considered a direct business injury.5s The
court, therefore, reasoned that no additional evidence was needed as a basis for
a general damage award. 59 Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that the
Supreme Court's statements in Bruce's Juices were not definitive, it nevertheless
considered such statements to be the Court's "considered, intended and indicative expression on the nature of the damage right under the Robinson-Patman
Act."'60 The Fowler court also noted this concept of damages, unlike the Enterprise rule, furthered the purpose of the Act. 61 The Supreme Court's silence concerning Robinson-Patman Act damages, 62 left the lower federal courts to
grapple with the divergent Elizabeth Arden and Enterprise rules.6 3
A related issue, the interaction of sections 4 and 7 of the Clayton Act, was
decided by the Supreme Court in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat.64 In
Brunswick, three bowling centers65 sued Brunswick for a violation of section 7
of the Act,66 and sought treble damages. The plaintiffs requested damages be
measured as the profits they would have received if Brunswick had not acquired
and operated competing bowling alleys.67 The Court determined that section 7
57. 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970).
58. 415 F.2d at 1252.
59. The court stated, "[w]e hold that under the Robinson-Patman Act, unless the evidence
establishes a greater consequential injury, discrimination in prices . . . is entitled to be regarded as constituting a direct business injury and that the amount thereof thus properly can
be made the basis and measure of a general damage award." Id. As in Elizabeth Arden, the
court made the amount of price discrimination the minimum damages to which the plaintiff
was entitled after proving a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. The plaintiff, however, was not limited to this amount if proof of greater injury could be tendered. Id.
60. Id. at 1251.
61. Id. "Furthermore, in a construction of the Act in relation to its purpose, it would
seem apparent that such a direct-damage right would more effectively serve to curb the discrimination which Congress [sought to abolish] . . . then the more difficult consequential
damage rule of the Enterprise case." Id. The Fowler court seemed to be making a conscious
choice against Enterprise, and was attempting to apply the rule which they saw as more
readily effectuating the Act's purpose. For a discussion of some perceived problems with
Fowler and its rationale, see Rez, note 56 supra.
62. The Supreme Court could have decided the issue earlier; however, the Court denied
certiorari in such cases as Fowler, Enterprise, and Elizabeth Arden leaving the lower courts
without a definitive adjudication of the issue.
63. Among the lower courts, Judge Hand's Enterprise opinion attracted more followers.
See, e.g., note 19 supra; Zwicker v. J.I. Case Co., 596 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1979); Dantzler v.
Dictograph Prod., Inc., 309 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1962); McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc., 486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.
1973).
64. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
65. Respondents were three of the 10 bowling alleys owned by Treadway, Co., and were
located in Pueblo, Colo., Poughkeepsie, N.Y., and Paramus, N.J. Id. at 479-80.
66. Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads in part: "No corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock . . . or . . . assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. §18 (1976).
67. Brunswick Corporation was one of the two largest manufacturers of bowling equip-
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of the Clayton Act was preventative in nature, and was designed primarily to
prohibit mergers68 which might have an anti-competitive effect.6 9 Section 4,
however, was considered a remedial statute designed to compensate for antitrust
injuries already suffered. 0 Examining the interaction of the two sections, the
Court held that treble damages were not recoverable upon merely a showing
that section 7 had been violated, because such proof established only that injury
might occur.71 The plaintiff was therefore required to prove injury of the type
the provision was intended to prevent.72 The Brunswick Court found that any
injury to the plaintiffs resulted from increased rather than decreased competiion.- Because section 7 was designed to prevent mergers which would decrease
competition, the plaintiffs did not suffer an injury of the type the statute was
designed to prevent74 and therefore could not recover.7 5
ment and the largest operator of bowling alleys. At the time of the trial, Brunswick owned
five times the number of bowling centers as its next largest competitor. In 1965, its net worth
was eight times larger than the eleven next largest chains, and its gross income was seven times
greater; however, it controlled only 2% of all bowling centers in the United States. Brunswick
acquired and operated many of these centers due to defaults on notes made to secure bowling
equipment purchased from Brunswick. Since Brunswick found it difficult to sell or dispose of
all of these, it operated those which it believed might prove successful. 429 U.S. at 479-80.
68. Section 7 has been held to apply to both horizontal and vertical mergers which may
have an anticompetitive or monopolistic impact on any geographic area of the country. See
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
69. 429 U.S. at 485. Accord, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201 (1974);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962); United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).
70. 429 U.S. at 485, 486 n.10 (citing 21 CONG. REG. 1767-68, 2612, 2615, 3146-49 (1890)
and H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong. 2d Sess. 14 (1914)).
71. "Plainly, to recover damages, respondents must prove more than that petitioner
violated section 7, since such proof establishes only that injury may result ....The Court of
Appeals [held] compensable any loss 'causally linked' to 'the mere presence of the violator in
the market' ....

Because this holding divorces antitrust recovery from the purposes of the

antitrust laws without a clear statutory command to do so, we cannot agree with it." 429 U.S.
at 486-87.
72. "We therefore hold that for plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of section
7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the
market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Id. at 489. This statement by the Court defined the causation and injury necessary to
recover damages for a violation of section 7. For a general discussion of the standards used
by courts in determining causation and injury under sections 7 and 4 prior to Brunswick, see
Note, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.: Injury and Causation Under Sections 4

and 7 of the Clayton Act, 10 Sw. U.L. REv. 667, 684-92 (1978).
73. 429 U.S. at 488. "At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers
petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondent of the benefits of increased
concentration. The damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the
profits they would have realized had competition been reduced." Id.
74. Id. The Court distinguished between injury to competition and injury to competitors.
The antitrust laws were designed to prohibit conduct injurious to competition, and therefore
to allow damages in that case would be contrary to the purpose of the statute. Id. See also
Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U.

Cm. L. REv. 467, 468-70 (1980); Note, supra note 72, at 684-92.
75. 429 U.S. at 488,490.
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The instant case expanded the narrow Brunswick holding to include section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.7 6 The Court rejected the petitioner's

reliance on Bruce's Juices by dismissing its statements on treble damages as
dicta,77 thereby implicitly denouncing the Elizabeth Arden and Fowler decisions.78 The Court relied instead on the Brunswick ruling,7 9 requiring the
plaintiffs to prove their injury resulted from the anticompetitive behavior of
the defendant 8O and was of the type section 2(a) was intended to prevent.81
In rejecting the concept of automatic damages, the Court considered two
key issues. First, the instant Court examined the statutory language of sections
2(a) and 4.82 The Court noted section 2(a) prohibits discriminatory pricing
which might lessen competition;83 thus, a violation of section 2(a) occurs when84
ever there is a possibility that price discrimination will be anticompetitive.
The Court also observed that statutory violations of section 2(a) do not require
that actual injury,8 5 and acknowledged it had previously held that showing
substantial price discrimination established an inference of injury sufficient to
grant injunctive relief.8 6 The Supreme Court rejected the instant petitioner's
argument that damages ought to be awarded under a similar inference.8 7 The
76. Brunswick applied specifically to section 7 violations. "This case raises important
questions concerning the interrelationship of the antimerger and private damages action provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Act." Id. at 478. "We therefore hold that for the plaintiffs to
recover treble damages on account of section 7 violations ....."Id. at 489.
77. See 101 S. Ct. at 1928 n.3. The Court's dismissal of the Bruce's Juices language dealing
with damages is perhaps more cursory than it ought to be. The dissenters in Bruce's Juices
viewed that language as decisive. "The issue in this case is whether sellers of goods should be
allowed to use the courts to collect price differentials which have been made illegal by
Congress in the Robinson-Patman Act. The Court approaches but never quite meets that
issue. But the unmistakable effect of the Court's decision is to permit the recovery of discriminatory prices despite the plain language and policy of the Act .... 330 U.S. at 757-58
(dissenting opinion). This indicates the language in question was considered more than dicta
and deserves more than an offhand dismissal.
78. By expanding Brunswick, the Court indicated plaintiffs must prove their injuries resulted from the defendant's antitrust violation. This effectively precludes the inference of
injury used under an automatic damage rationale. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's use of
Brunswick in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., see Cox, Antitrust, 12 Tax.
TEcH. L. REv. 77, 105-06 (1981).

79. 429 U.S. at 489.
80.

101 S.Ct. at 1927.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. "By its terms section 2(a) is a prophylactic statute which is violated merely upon a
showing that 'the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition.'"
Id.
84. Use of the word "may" in section 2 has been interpreted by the Court as meaning
more than a mere possibility. The language has been determined to apply to conduct which
would probably have the prohibited consequences. See, e.g., Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324
U.S. 726 (1945); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1921).
85. 101 S. Ct. at 1927. Accord, FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Corn Prod.
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
86. See note 15 supra.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 1927. "Petitioner notes that this Court has consistently permitted such
injury to be inferred in injunctive actions brought to enforce section 2(a) .... and argues that
private suits for damages under section 4 should be treated no differently. We disagree." Id.
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Court found that a damage suit required both an antitrust statute prohibiting
certain conduct88 and statutory authorization of damage recovery. 89 When suit
is brought under section 2(a) seeking treble damages under section 4, a violation of section 2(a) must be found and the requirements of section 4 must be
met.9 0 Because section 4 requires actual injury, 91 the Court reasoned that treble
damages are recoverable only where the Robinson-Patman violation results in
2
injury to the plaintiffY
The instant Court next considered the legislative history of the RobinsonPatman Act. The opinion stressed that while the original bill provided that
the plaintiff's damages would be presumed to be the amount of the price discrimination,93 this provision was deleted prior to the bill's passage. 94 The Court
therefore reasoned that a decision authorizing such an automatic damages recovery would be a judicial attempt to provide a Robinson-Patman remedy
95
Congress had deliberately eliminated
The instant Court's rule requiring actual proof of injury recognizes the
inequities inherent in granting automatic antitrust damages. Elizabeth Arden
and Fowler have been consistently criticized for failing to award damages commensurate with the actual injury suffered. 9 Such results may be particularly
unjust where treble damages are awarded. The overcompensation accorded a
successful antitrust plaintiff under such circumstances gives it a threefold edge
over its competitors through increased capitalization"s By forcing the RobinsonPatman Act plaintiff to prove actual injury, the Court reduced the possibility
of such windfalls.98
Commentators have also argued that automatic damages often overcompensates plaintiffs because the theory fails to account for the intricate nature of

antitrust injury. 99 The plaintiff may have actually lost sales, been forced to
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. For a discussion of damages allowed by courts prior to the instant case and the
types of proof necessary for establishing the plaintiff's injury, see Seplaki, The Economics of
Treble Damages Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 31 RUr. L. REv. 167 (1978); Weinberg,
supranote 16.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 1927.
92. Id. "It [plaintiff] must prove more than a violation of section 2(a), since such proof
establishes only that injury may result." Id. (Emphasis in original). "[P]roof of a violation
does not mean that a disfavored purchaser has been actually 'injured' within the meaning of
section 4." Id. For a discussion approving the requirement of actual injury, see Rez, supra
note 56.
93. 101 S. Ct. at 1927. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see notes 39-41
supra.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 1927. The provision was deleted in conference between the Houses. Id.
See notes 39-41 supra.
95. 101 S. Ct. at 1927. See note 42 supra.
96. These commentators do not find the Elizabeth Arden rationale concerning the I.C.C.
cases to be persuasive. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust Laws -Damages, 48 Tax. L. Rev. 690 (1970).
Elizabeth Arden had dealt with the I.C.C. rate case by finding them to be inapplicable to
price discrimination cases under the Robinson-Patman Act. 150 F.2d at 995-96.
97. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 48.
98. See Rez, supra note 56; Note, supra note 96.
99. Those commentators opposed to automatic damages have argued that such a theory of
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lower its price, or suffered a lower profit margin due to the discrimination;100
conversely, the plaintiff's location, variety of products, or market conditions
may have enabled it to negate or lessen its injury by selling goods at a higher
price.1°1 The injury, moreover, may have been caused by increased competition,
poor management, or changed market conditions, rather than price discrimination. 10 2 In light of such disparate possibilities,103 the Court's decision ensures
proper damages will be awarded.
In announcing its rule oE recovery, the instant Court appears to logically
extend its Brunswick rationale. Both cases dealt with treble damages for antitrust violations 104 and the instant Court merely applied the Brunswick interpretation of the interrelationship between sections 7 and 4 of the Clayton
Act, to a situation involving sections 2(a) and 4.105 This surface consistency,
however, belies a deeper inconsistancy regarding the Court's application of
Brunswick's rationale to the instant case.
Brunswick interpreted section 7 of the Clayton Act in light of its purpose:
to foster competition by preventing anticompetitive mergers. 0 6 The Brunswick plaintiffs' only claim of injury was for profits lost because Brunswick did
not close the bowling alleys it acquired through default 0 The plaintiffs' alleged injury resulted from the fact that Brunswick's actions maintained competitionl °8 which is not the kind of injury section 7 was intended to prevent.- °
Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act was intended to promote competition
by prohibiting discriminatory pricing practices that could adversely affect competition. 10 In the instant case, Chrysler's discriminatory practice injured the
petitioner's ability to compete."'3 Competition thus suffered, Under the Brunsrecovery can lead to an antitrust plaintiff's windfalls. A plaintiff who has not suffered any
injury is being compensated as if he had. See, e.g., Rez, supra note 56, at 661; Note, supra
note 96, at 694.
100. See, e.g., Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457, 458, 459 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). For a discussion of the different ways in which a plaintiff may be
injured in through a Robinson-Patman violation, see Seplaki, supra note 90, at 174-84.
101. See Seplaki, supra note 90, at 175. For a discussion of various measures of damages,
see Weinberg, supra note 16.
102. For a general discussion of other possible causes of a plaintiff's injury, see Rez, supra
note 56.
103. 101 S. Ct. 1923. The Court implicitly recognized that price discrimination is often
not the root cause of the plaintiff's injury when they acknowledged that proof of a section
2(a) violation does not necessarily mean the plaintiff has been injured. Id. at 1927.
104. Brunswick dealt with violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. See text accompanying
notes 66-72 supra. The instant case involved violations of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
105. The Brunswick decision was based on careful consideration of the language of
sections 4 and 7 of the Clayton Act. For a discussion of the Brunswick Court's statutory construction, see Note, supra note 72, at 684-94. Rehnquist, J. quoted extensively from Brunswick
in writing the instant opinion. 101 S. Ct. at 1927.
106. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 65 &67 supra.
108. See note 73 supra.
109. See note 74 supra.
110. For description of the Robinson-Patman Act's historical background, see E. KINTNER,
supra note 27, at 6-16.
111. Commentators agree that such discrimination affects the disfavored purchaser in
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wick reasoning, therefore, the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act would be
served by an award of damages.1 32 The instant Court's reliance on Brunswick
would consequently appear to be remiss. The Court merely adopts the Brunswick Court's focus on the interrelationship of two sections of the Clayton Act"53
without applying that Court's underlying reasoning."LIn addition, the Brunswick opinion concerned a violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act rather than a Robinson-Patman Act violation."L5 Section 7
violations can occur before a merger takes placell 6 because the provision was
designed to prevent anticompetitive mergers and prohibit possible future
mergers that may foster monopoly." 7 Robinson-Patman does not address future
price discrimination," 8 but curtails the possible anticompetitive effects of price
discriminations which have already occurred."19 The instant Court's application of Brunswick fails to address these differences, or explain why the Brunswick section 7 analysis should apply with equal force to section 2(a).
The instant Court's reliance on the legislative history of the RobinsonPatman Act is also questionable.120 The Court based its decision on original
versions of the Act, which authorized recovery of the amount of the price discrimination as the plaintiff's damages. 12 Other courts, however, have interpreted this history without reaching the instant Court's conclusion.12z For
some respect. See, e.g., Seplaki, supra note 90, at 174; Barber, supra note 55, at 210-16. Payne
argued that its higher per unit cost caused it to make larger trade-in allowances on used cars
and therefore to lose money on its used car operation. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 6.
For a more detailed description of the petitioner's injuries, see id. at 3-8.
112. If the purpose of the Act is to prevent anticompetitive effects from price discrimination, this purpose would not seem to be furthered by the instant case's requirement of actual
injury. See Barber, supranote 55, at 210-16.
113. 101 S. Ct. at 1927.
114. For a discussion of the reasoning underlying the Brunswick opinion, see text accompanying notes 66-74 supra.
115. For a discussion of the narrow holding of Brunswick, see note 76 supra; Posner, The
Antitrust Decisionsof the Burger Court,47 ANriRusr L.J. 819 (1979).

116. Section 7 was created to check monopolistic tendencies before they have a chance to
cause injury. The statute makes it unlawful for a company to acquire stock or assets in another corporation where the affect of that acquisition might be to decrease competition or
create a monopoly. See note 66 supra; Note, supranote 72.
117. For a discussion of this feature of section 7, see Note, supra note 72, at 667-72.
118. See, e.g., Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939). For a discussion
of this requirement, see E. KfrNrzaa, supra note 27, at 36-40; H. SHNIDERAAN, supra note 89, at
16-17.
119.

See generally E. KiNTNER, supranote 27, at 36-40.

120. Justice Rehnquist's use of legislative history and congressional intent has been questioned in the past. In an analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions of United Steelworkers v. Weber, Professor Ronald Dworkin discusses the use of congressional records and
statements by individual Senators or Congressmen in determining the intent of Congress.
Dworkin found that Rehnquist looked first to the language of the statute, and then to its
legislative history, in order to resolve any ambiguities and give effect to Congress' intent.
Dworkin argued that this intent-of-Congress theory was not particularly useful because the
whole concept is illusory. Dworkin demonstrated the flaws and ambiguities inherent in its
use. Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, 26 N.Y. REv. oF BooXS 37 (1979).

121. See note 40 supra.
122. See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945).
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example, the Elizabeth Arden court suggested that the deletion of the damage
provision was immaterial to the recovery of general damages and only affected
special or consequential damages. 123 Some commentators have attributed the
deletion to congressional belief that the damage clause was superficial or that it
might be construed to exclude consequential damages.24 Regardless of the
viability of these theories, the instant Court's superficial consideration of the
legislative history and its failure to address the alternative interpretations
undermines the Court's use of this rationale to justify its holding.
The instant decision also ignores the policy issues raised by Elizabeth Arden
and Fowler. Those decisions evinced concern for the detrimental effect of an
actual injury rule on private enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. 123
Despite the possibility of plaintiff overcompensation, automatic damages encouraged private enforcement of the antitrust laws.126 The instant Court's requirement of actual injury could, therefore, adversely effect private enforcement
12
of the Act. 7
Commentators generally agree that a legal climate that favors the plaintiff's chances for recovering treble damages deters antitrust violations.128 Requiring proof of injury, however, reduces the antitrust plaintiff's chances of
obtaining such damages. 29 The instant Court's actual injury rule may, therefore, additionally hinder private enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act by
increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof. 30 The Court's refusal to adopt an
automatic damages approach frustrates the congressional preference for private
31
enforcement of the antitrust laws?
123. Id. at 996.
124. Id. See also Petitioner's Reply Brief at 10. Patman, one of the original sponsors of the
bill attributed it to legislative bargaining; PATMAN, TE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 325 (1938).
125. See text accompanying notes 24 & 61 supra.
126. Commentators have agreed that private plaintiffs have become an important part of
the antitrust law enforcement scheme. See Page, supra note 74; Blair, Antitrust Penalties:
Deterrenceand Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 57 (1980); Weinberg, supra note 16.
Given the importance of the private plaintiff to antitrust enforcement, automatic damages
places a lighter burden on the private plaintiff, encouraging suits. See Barber, supra note 55.
127. For a discussion of the impact of an actual injury rule of recovery, see Barber, supra
note 55, at 21-216.
128. See Blair, supra note 126, at 60. On the deterrent effect of treble damages, see Barber,
supra note 55; Page, supra note 74; Seplaki, supra note 90.

129. See note 126 supra.
130. Barber suggests that discarding of automatic damages will result in an almost insurmountable barrier to private antitrust plaintiffs. Addressing the decline in acceptance of
the automatic damage formula, and the corresponding increase in the vitality of the Enterprise rule, Barber states, "if the courts continue to insist on such a very high degree of
precision in the proof of damages and causation . . . it will indeed be an exceptional case in
which a competitor, likely to have been injured in some measurable amount, will be able to
secure any monetary relief." Barber, supra note 55, at 218. Contra, Rez, supra note 56.
131. There has been some general disagreement on the overall effectiveness of private
enforcement of antitrust laws. The statistics are quite startling. During the first 25 years of
the Act, from 1936 through 1961, there were a total of 111 Robinson-Patman Act cases brought
by private plaintiffs. Of these, eight decisions were favorable to the plaintiff with six resulting
in damage awards. This figure does not include cases settled out of court prior to final

adjudication. See Barber, supra note 55, at 192-93. The statistics, however, may be misleading.
For instance, many plaintiffs may settle in order to avoid costly and time-consuming trials.
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